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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELDON L. ANDERSON, dba 
SILVER DOLLAR LOUNGE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, YUKUS Y. 
INOUYE, KARL R. LYMAN, 
and VERL D. STONE, as 
Comn1i s s ione rs, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. l5653 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant initiated this action in the Fourth District Court in 
and for Utah County, State of Utah, praying for an Extraordinary Writ to 
review and reverse the ruling by the Board of County Commissioners of 
Utah County which denied the appellant a business license. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth District Court, in and for Utah County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge presiding, entered its Order 
dismissing the plaintiff/appellant's complaint, no cause of action, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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apparently on the basis that the Utah County Commission has the absolu 
authority to revoke or deny a Class B Beer license without cause. >Jo 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made by the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the District Court's dec1s 10 n a:,: 
a finding that the Utah County Commission's denial of a lie ens e was arb:·: 1 
and capricious. Appellant seeks an order requiring the issuance of a U2 
B Beer license; and in the event this Court upholds the lower Court's 
decision, a restraining order pending the final determination of plaintiff/ 
appellant's second cause of action, pending in the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action wherein the plaintiff/appellant had filed on1· 
about December 15, 1975, an application for a Class B Beer license wiu, 
Utah County. (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, R-50) The Stipulated Facts contaP" ! 
in plaintiff's memorandum erroneously lists the filing date as July l, 1'1;' 
(R-8) 
After complaints filed against lhe appellant by the Sheriffs 
Office were dismissed by the Courts, the Utah County She riff i efus cd to 
23 19 76 "becaus• recommend approval of appellant's application on June , ' 
of numerous complaints of fighting, other disturbances and violations." 
(Appellant's Exhibit #1, R-50) These actions on the Sheriff's part foilc. 
2 
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the appellant's successful challenge of the Sunday closing law in Utah 
County in the Provo City Court, Case No. 20304. (Appellant's Exhibit 
R-9) By refusing to recommend approval of the appellant's license the 
Sheriff was proceeding under Section 7-6-2 of the Uta_h c t o d. 
_ . oun y r inances 
wherein the following language is found: 
"The commission may revoke any beer license upon 
recommendation of the Sheriff or the County Attorney 
when it appears to their satisfaction that any licensed 
premises has become a f1_~ as defined by County 
Ordinances .... " 
No specific charges were ever filed against the appellant by 
the Utah County Attorney or the Sheriff regarding the premises being a 
"nuisance", and there have been no convictions for any violations of law. 
Two hearings v.:ere held by the Utah County Commission, on 
August 16, 1976, and on September 27, 1976, and the appellant was ordered 
to show cause why his license should be renewed. The Commission denied 
the license renewal; and as a part of its findings, relied upon the fact that 
the appellant had plead guilty to a felony twenty-two (22) years earlier. 
Further, numerous fights and public disturbances allegedly occurred and 
minors were sold beer. (Page 2 of Findings and Decision of Commission 
at R-52) The Fourth District Court dismissed the charges of selling beer 
Lo minors because of the Sheriff's officer's wrongful conduct. (R-10) 
Appellant filed an appeal with the Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, alleging that the Commission's denial was arbitrary and capricious 
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(First Cause of Action) and that the Utah County Commission and the Ut, 
County Sheriff's Office conspired to deprive the appellant of his consti't: , 
rights in violation of Title 42 of the United States Code, Sections 1983 tr .. 
1985 (Second Cause of Action). By stipulation of counsel the Court issuec. 
temporary restraining order enjoining Utah County or its employees fror 
interfering with the appellant's ope ration of the Silver Dollar Lounge un• 
the matter could be decided on its merits. 
The Second Cause of Action is presently pending before the 
Fourth District Court, and this appeal was necessitated by the fact that 
the District Court dissolved its restraining order by its ruling dated 
January 30, 1978. Further, the Court made no findings of fact on the ,s;· 
of whether or not the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricio'-'I 
and held that the appellant's complaint should be dismissed, no cause ol 
action. It is from this decision that this appeal is taken. 
Finally, the Stipulated Facts contained in the appellants 
Memorandum of Authorities (R-8, 9 and 10) were orally stipulated to by 
the Utah County Attorney and should be made a part of this Statement 01 
Facts. (R-51, pages 4 and 5) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ISSUE 
4 
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PROPER FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO SUPPORT 
ITS DECISION WAS ERROR. 
On or about the 30th day of January, 1978, the Fourth District 
Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court's 
findings consist of a review of its procedural actions in arriving at a con-
clusion. Nowhere therein does the Court set forth an analysis of the 
material factual differences between the parties, nor does it establish any 
type of ultimate factual basis to support its decision to dismiss appellant's 
first cause of action and to dissolve appellant's preliminary injunction. 
Both the findings and conclusions are inadequate as neither 
purport to fulfill the purpose for which they were designed. Rule 52 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "Effect. In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury ... , the Court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .... 11 
The following case law supports and explains the foregoing: 
"Findings of Fact" may be defined as the written statement 
of the ultimate facts as found by the Court, signed by the Court, and filed 
therein, and essential to support a decision and judgment rendered therein. 
In re Good's Estate, 266 P2d 719, 729, 175 Kan. 576. 
l · of Law" are not ministerial "Findings of Fact" and "Cone us ions 
duties, but are fruits of judicial ascertainment. Allen v. U.S. ' DC Tex.' 
5 
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10 P2d 807, 809. 
Statements in a trial Court's memorandum regarding its,.,,, 
concerning the evidence were not "findings of fact." Ferderer v, Nori[,,, 
Pac. Ry. Co., 26 N. W. 2d 236, 244, 75 N. D. 139. 
The office of the "Findings of Fact" is to distill from the,,,. 
dence addressed at trial of a disputed issue the pertinent facts which m. 
be known by the court in order to enable it to determine and apply the 
relevant rules of law and thereupon to grant appropriate relief to the 
litigants. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee Mfg. Co., c. ca. Pa., [i; 
F2d 532, 535. 
In an early Utah case the Court stated, "It is the duty of the 
trial court to find upon all material issue raised by the pleadings, and 
failure to do so is reversible error." Baker v. Hatch, 70 Ut. 1, 257 
P673, at 676. 
This decision was followed by Sandall v. Hoskins, 104 Ut.' 
137 P2d 819, 822, which was a case to determine whether lessees were 
entitled to grazing rights in leased land. The Court stated at page 822' 
'"Findings of Fact' means ultimate facts which are 
conclusions of fact or deductions to be made from 
one or more basic or evidentiary facts to arrive al 
the final facts although the stepping stone facts in 
between may require the application of legal proposi-
tions to resolve them, and what should be contained 
in the findings of fact are those facts on each issue 
which are necessary to make flow from then1 a Law 
conclusion or to make such law conclusions intelligible.'' 
6 
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Gaddis Investment v. Morrison, 3 Ut. 2d 43, 278 P2d 284, 
reaffirmed the principle announced in Baker. This was a contract action 
by a real estate broker for his commission; the defendant raised the issue 
of abandonment of the contract by his answer, and the trial court failed 
to make findings of fact concerning this issue. Failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact on all material issues was said to be reversible 
error where it is prejudicial. 
And in LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Ut. 2d 260, 
420 P2d 615, which was a suit to enforce an alleged agreement to convey 
interest in certain mining property and to recover money advanced to 
defendant where the trial court failed to make findings of fact, lhis Court 
said at page 616: 
"The right to ~esort to the Courts for the adjudication 
of grievances and the settlement of disputes is funda-
mental. .. an indisposable requisite to fulfilling that 
responsibility is the determinations of questions of 
fact when there is disagreement. It is for this reason 
that our rules ... impose ... the duty of making findings 
on all male rial is sues." 
The Alaska State Supreme Court has said: 
"It is the duty of a trial court to deal adequately with 
and state with clarity what it finds as facts and what 
it holds as conclusions of law. The findings and 
conclusions should be so explicit as to give this Court 
a clear understanding of the basis for the decision 
made." (Dickerson v. Geiermann, 368 P2d 217 (1962) 
at 219.) 
7 
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In the instant case, the appellant has not been provided cithn 
a reason or an understanding as to the basis of the trial court's dc-cision, 
This is most perplexing to the appellant because appellant was directed 
through his counsel to research and submit to the Court a memorandum 
concerning the authority, if any, of the Utah County Commission to deny 
the appellant's renewal application without stating or determining cause, 
This task was accomplished and to the best of the appellant's knowledgP 
no counter memorandum was filed by the respondents. 
However, neither the findings of fact or conclusions of law 
address any of the points presented to the Court by the appellant; and he 
is totally without knowledge, either in fact or law, as to the reason for 
the denial of his renewal application. 
POINT 11 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
THE UTAH COUNTY COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO RENEW APPELLANT 
CLASS B BEER LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
There is little question that the issuance or renewal of the 
liquor license itself ordinarily rests in the studied discretion of the bod\ 
which has been delegated such power. However, there does exist a 
question as to the proper exercise of such discretion; for while it is broac 
it cannot be applied arbitrarily or capriciously. 
8 
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"The intentment of the law is that the discretionary 
decision shall be the outcome of examination and 
consideration, and not a mere expression of personal 
will, and the refusal of licensing authorities to issue 
a license without having made due inquiry into the 
relevant facts and without having stated its reason for 
such refusal is arbitrary •... " (45 Am Jur 2d 603 
"Intoxicating Liquors", Sec. 161) ' 
Renewal of a license is a matter of the state authority's 
discretion after a consideration of all factors, including prior conduct of the 
licensed premises, which could properly be considered in issuing a license. 
Fernandez v. State Liquor Authority, 122 NYS 2d 592, ll5 NE 2nd 829. 
Normally, a permit to carry on a liquor business is renewable 
or revocable in the manner provided by statute. 48 Corpus Juris 
Secundum 277, "Intoxicating Liquors" Chapter 6, Section 7-6-1, of the 
Utah County Ordinances vests in the County Commission the power to 
revoke licenses " ... for any violation of this ordinance or any other 
ordinance or law or for any other good cause. 11 (Emphasis added) Section 
2 specifies that the Commission may revoke a license when in its opinion 
such action is necessary for the protection of public helath, peace or morals. 
On its face, the cited chapter mandates that cause need be established and 
considered by the licensing body in determining whether or not a license shall 
issue. While wide discretion may be given in the exercise of that discre-
tion, it must be governed by a proper consideration of the facts and 
circumstances of each applicant. The right to refuse for cause of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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necessity vests in the Commission the duty to determine what is· good CJ" 
for refusal. "A revocation for 'cause' generally must be based on a 
violation of the liquor law or of regulations promulgated thereunder." 48 
Corpus Juris Secundum 282 , "Intoxicating Liquors" A lack of such 
determination a bus es the Commission's discretionary power and makes 1·• 
action arbitrary and capricious. 
"Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an 
administrative board can arise in only three ways, 
namely: (a) By neglecting or refusing lo use reason-
able diligence and care to procure such evidence as it 
is by law authorized to consider in exercising the 
discretion vested in it; (b) By failing to give candid 
and honest consideration of the evidence before it on 
which it is authorized to act in exercising its discre-
tion; (c) By exercising its discretion in such a 
manner after a consideration of evidence before it as 
clearly to indicate that its action is based on conclu-
sions from the evidence such that reasonable men 
fairly and honestly considering the evidence must 
reach contrary conclusions." (Van De Vegt v. Board 
of Com' rs of Larimer County, 55 P2d 705, Colo. 1936) 
While the liquor authorities need not follow the precise rules 
of evidence and procedure required to be followed by judicial officers, 
they can annul or suspend a license only on competent proof. Migliacc~ 
O'Connell, 307 NY 566, 122 NE 2d 914. 
Refusal by the Commission to issue a license without havin.c 
made due inquiry into the relevant facts and without stating its reasons· 
such refusal would be arbitrary and not the exercise of legal discretion. 
10 
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Under such circumstances, an applicant might be entitled to invoke the 
extraordinary remedy of mandamus. The United States ex rel Roop v. 
Douglas, 19 D.C. 99. 
This inquiry should consist of the taking and examining of 
evidence. The right to revoke or suspend a liquor permit as a general 
rule depends on the evidence presented. The burden is on the board or 
officer to prove the facts which constitute the causes which are alleged as 
grounds for revocation or suspension. Cambell v. Galena Chemical Co., 
N. Y. 50 S. Ct. 412, 281 US 599, 74 L Ed 1063. In the case before the 
Court no specific charge was ever made against the appellant. When this 
license renewal application was denied without a hearing, the burden was 
placed upon the appellant to prove that he was operating lawfully. As to the 
weight and sufficiency of such evidence, general rules of evidence apply as 
lo whether it is sufficient to prove particular facts or violations. Arrow 
Distilleries v. Alexander, C. C. A., 109 F2d 397. Although evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt or overwhelming proof is not required, there 
must be substantial evidence of probative character to sustain the action 
of the deciding body. It has been held that revocation cannot be based upon 
evidence which causes a mere suspicion of a violation of a liquor statute. 
Mahanoy Mfg. Co. v. Doran, D. C. Pa. 40 F2d 561. This Court went on 
lo say at page 561, "The real question is not so much over the facts as 
over the other question of whether the truth of the charge was brought home 
11 
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to the perrnitee with that degree of certainty which would juslify a revo-
cation of Lhe permit." 
There is no question that where a licensing board conducts a 
proper hearing and assigns a valid reason for refusing to grant a license 
the courts, in the absence of a showing that the action of the board was a 
abuse of its plain legal duty in the premises, will not assume there waso 
lack of substantial reason for such action. However, appellant contends 
that such was not the case here. 
In O' Conner v. City of Moscow, 202 P2d 401, Idaho 1949, a 
case involving a question as to whether or not a city ordinance deeming 
change of ownership of an existing business in which draft beer or liquor 
by the drink was sold to be a new or additional business and thus prohibit! 
from operating within specified areas, the Idaho Court, at page 405, sta'd' 
it is said: 
"While a license to operate a beer parlor ... does not 
confer any vested property right, yet if the city makes 
such businesses lawful by a permit or license, it can-
not arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably impair, 
interfere with or eradicate the same. 11 
On page 67, 51 Arn Jur 2d, "License and Permits", Sec 62 
"The weight to be given to evidence presented in a 
hearing in which it is sought to suspend or revoke a 
license rests ... in the discretion of. .. body ... con-
ducting the hearing. However, it has been said that 
hearsay evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient 
to support the suspension or revocation of a license 
12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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where the licensee is entitled to a hearing on the 
matter involved." (Emphasis added) 
In lhe instant matter, the Commission considered no hard 
evidence but relied upon a simple written statement of the County Sheriff 
upon the appellant's application to the effect that the Silver Dollar Lounge 
was involved in" ... numerous complaints of fighting, other disturbances 
and violations." These allegations have never been supported by evidence 
from the Sheriff's Office, and the appellant maintains that they are unfounded 
and a re in effect hearsay allegations. 
Revocation of a license for cause has been said to contemplate 
such cause as would render the licensee unfit to engage in the licensed 
activity with his fitness being judged in the light of the potential evil with 
which the legislature was· concerned in enacting the licensing legislation. 
As heretofore stated, the ordinance herein involved is Chapter 
6, "Revocation of Licenses'', Sections 7-6-1 and 7-6-2, which are set forth 
as follows: 
"7-6-1. Revocation After Notice and Hearing 
Any license issued under this Title may be revoked 
after notice to and hearing for the licensee, unless 
otherwise specifically provided for herein or in any 
other ordinance. After notice of and hearing con-
cerning the revocation of a license, the Commission 
may revoke the license of any licensee for any 
violation of this ordinance or any other ordinance 
or law or for any other cause which the Commission 
deems good and sufficient. 
13 
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7-6-2. Revocation of Beer Licenses 
The Commission may with or without hearing at its 
discretion, refuse to grant any beer license applied 
for and may revoke any license at any time, when 
in its opinion it is necessary for the protection of 
public health, peace or morals, and in no such 
case need any cause be given, if any applicant or 
licensee shall not possess or shall cease to possess 
all of the qualifications required by the Liquor 
Control Act of Utah, or fails to comply with the 
ordinances of the County. It shall be unlawful for 
any person to engage in the sale of beer after 
revocation of his license until he may again qualify 
as provided herein to engage in the sale thereof. 
The Commission may revoke any beer license upon 
recommendation of the Sheriff or the County Attorney, 
when it appears to their satisfaction that any licensed 
premise has become a nuisance as defined by County 
Ordinances, or a disorderly house, and in any case 
where the license is so revoked no license shall again 
be issued for such premises for a period of six 
months after revocation. 11 
The ordinance, on its face, requires notice and a hearing ano 
places a burden upon the County Commission to consider certain standard', 
i.e., establish cause, before revoking a license, to-wit: 
1. Protection of public health, peace or morals; 
2. Lack of qualifications required by the Liquor Control Act. 
These standards are to be met as determined by the "opinion" of the 
Commission. Is this opinion to be based upon hearsay, assumption, 
prejudice or facts? It would appear inconceivable that considering the 
interests involved and all that has been said above that any decision 
reached would be based upon anything but facts and/or relevant evidence 
14 
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Yel, nowhere in the record do such facts or evidence appear. It is the 
appellee's contention that no cause need be established, a fact that 
appellant contends is in opposition to the cited sections of the ordinance 
under the rules of otatutory construction. 
The Utah case of Pehrson v. City Council of City of Ephraim, 
(l896) 14 Utah l47, 46 P 657, which appears to be very much in point here, 
involved an application for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review 
the action of defendant which revoked the plaintiff's license to sell liquors. 
The action of the defendant had not been explained on the basis that Section 
2 of the statute in question did not require cause to be shown. The Court 
disagreed saying that Sections land 2 of the statute in question were in 
conflict; at page 658: 
"The statute vests in such court and counsel a legal 
discretion, which must be exercised on a reasonable 
and not in a willful manner, and only for cause can a 
license be withheld. Therefore, the action by which a 
license is granted or withheld must be based upon 
such relevant facts as may come before the body which 
is called upon to act. ... Those who sit to administer 
the law should administer it fairly. Where a thing is 
to be done, for cause, in the exercise of discretion, 
the law intends a sound discretion, and the action should 
be based upon the merits of the case as shown by the 
facts in relation to it." 
A similar situation has arisen in the instant case. Section 
7-6-l requires notice and hearing and states that revocation must be based 
upon some cause. However, the trial court relied upon Section 7-6-2 to 
15 
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the effect that "· .. in no such case need any cause be given ... " to 
justify its conclusions. This appears to fall directly within the reasonin~ 
of Pehrson and requires a factually substantiated cause as determined or 
the merits. 
In the instant case the only established fact presented to the 
Commission was that Eldon L. Anderson had plead guilty to a felony 
approximately 22 years prior. The incident involved the theft of several 
bales of hay by Mr. Anderson and two other persons when they were 
approximately 18 years of age. The Commission used this as part of its 
findings in denying the application of Mr. Anderson. This record was 
expunged in Case No. 2832, Fourth District Court of Utah County. (R-oZ 
page 3) 
In Pennsylvania Distilling Co. v. Pennsylvania Alcohol Fermi' 
Bd., (1933) 20 Pa. D&C 385, where the alcohol permit board refused a 
liquor license on the grounds that the officers of the applicant corporatior 
had admitted that they had been guilty of violations of the National Prohi-
bition Act many years before the first license was granted, the Court he!c 
that the licensing authority may not refuse the renewal of the license. 
The Court pointed out that where a permit is issued and the licensee, 
upon the strength of that permit, invests large sums of money in plant 
and equipment, it would be almost intolerable to permit the licensing 
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authorities Lo refuse subsequent permits, and the court determined that 
the licensing authorities had abused their discretion. 
Although it is recognized that a license to sell intoxicating 
liquor is not property in any constitutional sense, it is contended that 
because of the conditions under which such licenses are issued, a 
liquor license can be said to have the quality of property with an actual 
pecuniary value far in excess of the license fee executed. It has been said 
that a liquor license is a legal interest in the nature of an economic asset 
created by statute; and because it has monetary value, it possesses the 
qualities of property, 45 Am Jur 2d 569, "Intoxicating Liquors", Sec. ll7, 
and it should not be disputed that one who has been granted a liquor license 
invests money and labor in his business. 
The above reasoning applies directly in this case because the 
application in question is an application for a renewal. Mr. Anderson 
submitted his application on December 15, 1975; and he had already been 
operating his business for several years and had invested large sums of 
money into it. The Utah County Commission did not act upon the request 
until July 12, 1976; and il was during this period that Mr. Anderson 
experienced unusual investigative pressure from the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office. The end result was a denial of Mr. Anderson's application 
because, as stated by the appellees, his business was "not being operated 
in a lawful manner." To this dale the appellant has not been found guilty 
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of violating any law. 
In Pennsylvania the view has been taken with what app<>ars •,, 
be common sense that administrative discretion in refusing the renewitl 
of a liquor license is not so broad as in refusing an application made for 
the first time. Charles D. Karer Co. v. Doran, (1930) 42 FZd 923. In 
Doran the Court said that in the case of an original permit, the judgmec' 
of unfitness is prospective and involves a judgment as to the future cond'.' 
whereas in renewal cases the judgment is retrospective and involves the 
question of whether anything has been done or omitted which warrants a 
finding of unfitness. The Court also said that the fact that the applicanr 
for a renewal has had a permit for many successive years is one of muc 
significance, as property rights have grown up under a granted permit 
and, consequently, no just administrator will refuse to renew it and socr· 
troy the value of the investment unless the conduct of the permitee or 
other sufficient reasons justify such refusal. 
And in a case where the evidence for and against the necess 
for licensing the petitioner's hotel was evenly divided, the fact that the 
house had been licensed before was held to be prima facie evidence of'" 
necessity and the license was granted. Helling's License, (1886) 2 Pa. 
Co 76. 
Was the Utah County Commission's ruling in this case 
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arbilrary and capricious? There have been no complaints made by the 
cilizenry of Utah County againsl the appellant. The appellant's place of 
business is not near any residence, and no citizen's complaints have been 
filed against the Silver Dollar Lounge. The only complaints on record are 
l hose of the Ulah County Sheriff's Office as reflected in paragraphs 2 and 
3 of lhe Commission's findings. These complaints are simply allegations. 
There have not been any convictions for the sale of beer lo minors, for 
public nuisance or for dislurbance. No actual witnesses have appeared 
before the Commission, and no convictions againsl the appellant have been 
put into evidence. Because there are none, the allegations of the Utah 
County Sheriff remain allegations since no prosecutions that could have 
resulted in revocation of the license have been initiated. If the Sheriff's 
Office did indeed have complaints made to it concerning the appellant's 
business, why were they not pursued? The conclusion must be that it was 
fell that such complainls were eilher unfounded or not considered serious 
enough lo warrant proseculion. 
Based upon the indicated lack of facts and evidence, the 
Cornn1ission's action and method of denying the appellant a license were 
both arbitrary and capricious and denied lhe appellant due process of law. 
It is submitled that the respondents violated the rule of statutory construc-
I ton in failing to follow the mandate of lhe cited ordinances. Nowhere in the 
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material before the Court is there adequate establishment of "cause" 10 
justify the denial of the appellant's application for a new license. What 
does appear in the material before the Court is the clear indication that 
the actions of the Cor,unission and the Sheriff's Office were an attempt 
to close the Silver Dollar Lounge for the sole reason that Eldon L. 
Anderson attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Utah County 
Sunday closing law as it related to the sale of beer. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Trial Court 
should be reversed and the following relief granted: 
1. The denial of appellant's application for a Class B Beer 
license should be held to have been an arbitrary and capricious decision. 
and the Utah County Commission should be ordered to issue said licenst 
to the appellant; 
2. In the alternative, this Court should remand the mattert' 
the District Court with the direction that specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law be prepared by the Court; 
3. In the alternative, if this Court upholds the District 
Court's ruling on the summary dismissal of appellant's petition, a 
restraining order should issue directing Utah County to refrain from 
interfering with the appellant's operation of the Silver Dollar Lounge 
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until the second cause of action is heard on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MATT BILJANIC 
Attorney for Ap llant 
7355 South 9th East 
Midvale, Utah 8404 7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to Glenn Burningham, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 60 East 
100 South, Provo, Utah, 84601, postage prepaid, this ____ day of 
-------' 19 7 8. 
MATT BILJANic/ 
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